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Introduction 
The ‘Whitley Committee on Relations between Employers and Employed’ was 
established in 1916 as a sub-committee of the ‘Cabinet Committee on Reconstruction’ 
to examine the effects of wartime government measures on industrial organisation. 
The Commission was the government’s response to a number of pre-war trends in 
industrial relations including: rising trade union membership and strikes; growing 
labour demands for ‘worker control’, realisation that wartime controls to restrain 
strikes would be removed after the war. In addition, it was a response to the need to 
                         
1 w.gill-mclure@wlv.ac.uk  
N  2 
deal with demobilisation of soldiers and officers in the trenches fighting not just for 
peace in the world but a better place to live in after the war; and the extension of the 
franchise by 8 million voters. This included 6 million women who had experience of 
working and unionism in wartime (Whitley,1917 & 1918/2012; Goodrich, 1975; 
Clynes, 1918). 
 
John Henry Whitley chaired the Committee. A successful businessman,  Liberal MP 
for Halifax and Deputy Speaker of the House of Commons (1911-21), Whitley’s call 
for a “social revolution” to avert a Russian-type political Revolution, represented a 
key current of thought amongst Liberals.  He called for a “New Liberalism” that 
would combine social revolution and reform without the “madcap or Utopian 
schemes” on offer from, he claimed, the Labour Party (Whitley, 1918/2012). This 
‘compromise’ which permeates the Whitley Reports (1917 and 1918) and their careful 
language may help to explain unanimity on the Reports’ recommendations despite the 
Committee being dominated by labour movement representatives. However, there 
was a note of dissent to the Final Report from the latter: 
 
“…a complete identity of interests between capital and labour cannot …be 
affected…in an economic system primarily governed and directed by motives 
of private profit” (Whitley, 1917; Farnham, 1979) 
 
The recommendations of the First Report for standing Joint Industrial Councils (JICs) 
in the 'well-organised' industries like cotton, shipbuilding, iron and steel and 
coalmining, were largely ignored (as they offered little novelty). In a subsequent 
report, examining the less well-organised industries, the Committee recommended, 
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“almost as an afterthought”, the proposals be extended to state and municipal 
authorities (Whitley, 1917; Clay, 1929; Sheldrake, 1988, p.4). And it was in these 
industries, where general unions were organising unskilled and semi-skilled workers, 
and in state and municipal authorities, that the recommendations were taken up. A 
major reason for this was the Whitley Reports’ assertion of the principle of trade 
union recognition and its outline of a system of conciliation to be organised at 
national, district and works-level to meet on a regular basis. In public services, where 
unions had been struggling for recognition for three decades, this system offered hope 
(Clegg, Fox and Thompson, 1964; Webb and Webb, 1920a). Indeed, public services 
in the UK were to become synonymous with Whitleyism in the 20th century.  
 
Whitleyism reflected the voluntarist approach to labour relations of the 19th century. 
With roots in laissez-faire economics, voluntarism denoted employer and trade union 
antipathy to state intervention and a reluctance on the part of the state to regulate the 
employment relationship. The voluntarist roots of Whitleyism had a number of 
unintended consequences for public sector IR. Its legacy has meant most public 
servants have no distinct legal status as in some other parts of  Europe and that public 
sector IR is vulnerable to shifts in government policy (from progressive/regressive 
public administration). It also influenced the evolution of a hybrid and distinctive 
model of union behaviour. This included political lobbying and a professional and 
non-commercial public service ethos married to a capacity for industrial action and 
organisation borrowed from the private sector.1 This model evolved in response to the 
contradictions and conflicts of the laissez-faire, voluntarist approach to managing pay 
and performance in the public sector.  
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The paper outlines the Whitley recommendations for conciliation machinery and their 
underlying principles. It traces the rise of Whitleyism to underlying currents in public 
opinion, labour movement activity and wartime preoccupations. From this vantage 
point, the paper then looks back at 1880s-1917 at the struggle by public service 
unions against low pay, sweated labour, nepotism and corruption. This look backward 
shows why Whitleyism offered such hope. The paper then looks forward from 1919 
to the present in three phases: 1919-1948; 1948-1979 and finally 1979-present to 
examine the Whitley legacy in public services: how did the machinery and principles 
evolve; what were their strengths and weaknesses; how were principles for pay and 
performance to be developed in a non-market sector; what consequences would the 
legacy of voluntarism have on public service and public service IR over the next 100 
years.  
 
1. The Political Economy of Whitleyism: The Crucible of War 
“...there is no one break in the long series from syndicalism to Whitleyism, 
and the widespread acceptance of the latter in middle class thinking is a hint of 
the driving force of the more drastic doctrines”. (Goodrich,1975,p.7) 
 
Between 1910-1913, the number of industrial stoppages doubled that for the seven 
preceding years (Clay, 1929, p.16; Phelps Brown, 1959). In 1917, in line with an 
international trend, nearly 6 million working days were lost in strikes, more than 
double the number for 1916 (Sheldrake, 1988, p.9). Overall union membership grew 
from two and a half million in 1910 to almost eight and a half million in 1920 (Clay, 
1929, p.143). There was growing criticism amongst 'socialist' thinkers and public 
opinion of the economic and political order of the day (Hobsbawm, 1968; Foote, 
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1997).2 And the rise of the Labour Party was a recognition of the fundamental conflict 
between ‘Labour’ and ‘Capital’ (Webb and Webb, 1920; Foote, 1997). Laissez-faire 
had become untenable and state intervention in labour matters, designed to deal with 
the problems of unemployment in the years of the trade depression (1904-05), was 
stepped up by the Liberal government in a series of legislative measures aimed at 
social reform (Clay, 1929; Foote, 1997).   
 
Meanwhile a disillusioned Trade Union Movement, in response to rising prices and 
reduced wages (in tandem with rising profits) and the dislocations of war, was 
increasingly drawn by the syndicalist demand for 'direct action' through industrial 
means (Webb and Webb, 1920, p.665; Clay, 1929, p.146). The needs of wartime 
production made all classes of labour, skilled and unskilled, indispensable and gave 
‘labour a new sense of power and new ambitions’ which expressed itself in a demand 
for industrial self-government (Clay, 1929, p.148; Goodrich, 1919/1975). 
 
As the war continued, union leaders became increasingly involved in the 
government's war effort, many even taking up government office. Under the 
Munitions of War Act 1915, unions agreed to give up the right to strike, accept 
dilution (the principle that skilled work can be carried out by lower-skilled and female 
labour) and recognise compulsory arbitration (Cole, 1923/1973; Sheldrake, 1988, 
p.8). The shop floor response to this 'industrial pacifism' of the leadership was 
agitation for 'workshop control' (Gallacher & Paton in Cole, 1923/1973, Appendix H). 
Labour shortages and the effects of dilution enhanced the power of shop stewards as 
grievances were handled locally (Cole, 1923/1973; Hinton, 1973). Discontent 
amongst the rank and file erupted in the strikes of May, 1917 in the engineering 
N  6 
industry, prompting the Lloyd George coalition government’s appointment of the 
‘Whitley Commission of Inquiry into Industrial Unrest’ which recommended the 
adoption of the Whitley Committee's first report (Clay, 1929; French, 1995/2011).   
 
Whitley Reports : Principles and Machinery of Conciliation 
The Committee produced five reports. The first, known as ‘The Whitley Report' 
addressed the 'well-organised' industries, recommending the establishment of Joint 
Industrial Councils (JICs). As the Webbs noted, it made a “great stir, increased by the 
definite endorsement of its recommendations by the Government” (Webb and Webb, 
1920a, p.647).  Clay felt the reasons for this were due to “pre-existing currents of 
opinion of which the Report seemed to be a fulfilment.” (Clay, 1929, p.151). The 
Final Report's claim to be “conferring upon the joint councils...a large measure of 
self-government” was a faint echo of the syndicalist demand for 'complete control' 
(Clay, 1929, p.152; Goodrich, 1919/1975, p.5) 
 
The report was ‘conservative’ rather than ‘innovatory’ but,  
 
“its importance consisted in three things: it asserted the principle of trade 
union recognition, it embodied the outlines... of any effective conciliation 
scheme, and it made a case for widening the scope of conciliation 
organisation.” (Clay, 1929, p.152) 
  
The First Report laid down three minimal conditions that any machinery for 
conciliation should satisfy: firstly, that it should be national in scope; secondly, that it 
must be ‘standing’ or permanent and thirdly, while national in extent, it should be 
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decentralised in action. Its proposed hierarchy of national, district and works councils 
was criticised by syndicalists for making national councils the basis of its structure, 
that is, for recommending a top-down structure (Webb and Webb, 1920, p.647; Clay, 
1929, p.156). One union member of the Whitley Committee insisted that without 
strong organisation at Works Committee-level, the national JIC was “A superstructure 
with no foundation”, and hence impossible (Button, 1918).3 Against this, others 
argued that the top-down approach was necessary to get round the problem of poorly 
organised workplaces and the existence of multi-unionism which would make it 
difficult to establish works councils (Clay, 1929).4  
 
The ‘triple organisation’ needed to work according to a ‘common principle’ but its 
precise function would depend on the parties concerned (Whitley, 1919, para. 13). 
The Report outlined the main elements of a triple structure for conciliation machinery 
giving examples of issues to be dealt with ranging from settling pay and conditions, to 
technical education and training. The Report repeatedly argues that each industry and 
district will have different needs and state intervention is best limited to promoting or 
advising.  
 
This voluntarist principle reaffirmed the laissez-faire policy of a separation of politics 
from society and economy leaving Capital and Labour to sort out their own houses. 
Some contemporaries saw the weakness in voluntarism arguing that the Minister of 
Labour should “order the parties to meet” and “table a framework”, for the parties 
would not meet voluntarily (Button, 1918, p.4).  Others argued that more government 
intervention would have permitted “the whole conciliation machinery of the country 
to be systematically reviewed” (Clay, 1929, p.157). It certainly would have made 
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establishing Whitleyism in local government much less of a struggle in the inter-war 
period. In the event, voluntarism meant that Whitleyism was not taken up in the well-
established industries. Some have argued that this was unfortunate as Whitleyism 
could have averted much post-war industrial conflict. 
 
Nevertheless, the Whitley recommendations were significant for the labour 
movement. They constituted a “public and official recognition of trade unionism and 
collective bargaining” at a time when “large groups of employers were still refusing 
to recognise the unions when war broke out” (Clay, 1929; Clynes, 1918, p.21; 
Greenwood, 1913).5 However,  
 
“Such official recognition was the conclusion to which the practice of industry 
and the investigations of successive commissions and committees pointed... it 
marked the close of an epoch. Collective bargaining, for which organised 
labour had been fighting for over a century, was authoritatively pronounced 
normal and necessary…” (Clay, 1929,p.154,177). 6 
 
In sum, the Whitley Reports reflect some key related threads of social and economic 
thought of wartime Britain in 1917: a growing acceptance of the differences between 
Capital and Labour; the need for conciliation to avert industrial conflict; the need for 
‘reconstruction’ and ‘reconditioning’ of industry as better ways of reducing 
production costs than wage reduction (Clay, 1930, p.157). The Reports, while 
redolent with ethical premises, represented a pragmatic response designed to placate 
Labour at a time of revolution abroad and wartime (including imminent postwar) 
demands for radical reform at home. The trade union leaders on the Committee were 
N  9 
mostly in tune with this approach and keen to get Whitleyism introduced in the 
private sector and in government employment (Clynes, 1917; Button, 1918). 
 
The premises underlying Whitley mark thus the rise of a ‘pluralist’ approach to IR as 
well as the growing recognition of the need for state intervention in industry. It was a 
view that was strengthened during WWII with a Central Planning Committee being a 
major item on the agendas of the Wartime Reconstruction Committee of the 1940s.7  
 
A key strength of Whitley was its flexibility which permitted variations according to 
circumstances, as the Committee noted. However, the problems of getting Whitley 
adopted in public services in the interwar period demonstrate a key weakness of the 
voluntarist approach underlying Whitley. The government’s reluctance to recognise 
union organisation amongst its employees was noted in frequent exchanges in the 
House of Commons and although it gave way by adopting Whitleyism, the speed of 
adoption and union gains were slow and hard-won in the interwar years (Morris, 
1919; Kelly, 1980). 
  
Adoption of Whitley in Public Services: Hope after Early Struggles 1880s-1919 
From the 1880s, there was growth in trade union membership and collective 
bargaining as well as growing amounts of state intervention in the newly emerging 
public services. Indeed, there was a remarkable growth in public sector trade 
unionism throughout the 20th century. Between 1911-1979, union membership in 
Britain grew by a factor of four; in the public sector, it grew by a factor of ten (Fryer, 
1989). There was a sustained increase in the Depression years of the 1920s when 
private sector unions suffered heavy losses (Spoor, 1967; Fryer, 1989, p.19). 
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However, the 1930s were difficult times due to cuts in public expenditure and 
recession with a public sector pay cut of 10-20 per cent imposed in 1931 (Parris, 
1973, p.90; Carpenter, 1985, p.25; Bozio and Johnson, 2010, p.219). 
 
Unionism amongst the ‘black-coated proletariat’, that is, clerks, shop assistants and 
government employees, grew rapidly between 1890-1920 with the largest growth 
amongst civil servants (which included post office workers) and local government 
officers; even police and prison officers attempted unsuccessfully to establish a trade 
union (Webb & Webb, 1920a, p. 503-11). School teachers had joined unions by 1870 
and NUT (National Union of Teachers) membership rose dramatically over the next 
couple of decades (Webb & Webb, 1920a, p. 506; Clegg et. al. 1964, p.223; Seifert, 
1987, p.15). In 1919, the Burnham variant of Whitley was established for teachers 
(Ironside & Seifert, 1995, p24). Civil service unions were at first denied recognition 
but successfully established a series of joint councils after the publication of the 
Whitley Reports (Webb & Webb, 1920a, p. 509; Clegg et. al. 1964, p.215; Clegg, 
1979, p.32).  
 
Prior to the establishment of the National Health Service (NHS) in 1948, bargaining 
arrangements were scarce for most groups of workers partly due to the fragmented 
structure of the service but also due to resistance from employers (Carpenter, 1985). 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the hospital service was divided into three 
separate spheres: lunatic asylums, voluntary hospitals, poor law infirmaries and 
workhouses. As public employment was not protected by the Factory Acts, hours 
were long (over 70 a week), wages low and docked if inmates escaped on their watch 
(ibid. p.10-11).  Asylum staff started to organise in unions by 1910 and in the poor 
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law service by the 1920s. However, union organisation in voluntary hospitals did not 
commence until WWII. A Whitley Committee for national asylum(s) workers was 
established in 1919 and achieved national pay and conditions of service.  However, 
the impact of high unemployment in the interwar years ‘burst the union bubble’ and 
the unions struggled to protect the gains they had so far made (ibid. p23).  
  
Similar trends are found in local government which included public utilities - gas, 
electricity supply, water supply and tramways. Union organisation was well-
developed in most of these and NJICs were established in 1919 (Sheldrake, 1988). 
Amongst other manual municipal workers, the forerunners of NUPE (National Union 
of Public Employees) had been successfully building membership from the 1880s 
(Dix & Williams, 1987). By 1919, they had fought a successful campaign to win 
public support for direct labour (as opposed to contracting-out to private bidders) and 
established an NJIC for non-trading services. Local government illustrates well a core 
weakness of Whitleyism: due to its voluntarist approach, enforcement of national 
terms and conditions depended entirely on union bargaining power. Here, the 
employers refused the demand for a national wage rate in 1919 and the union side 
agreed that wages should be settled locally. The interwar period was thus spent 
building up union organisation to gain local recognition by provincial council 
employers.8 NALGO (National Association for Local Government Employers), 
organising white-collar municipal staff, faced a similar situation.  
 
The coal-mining industry though highly unionised at the time of the Whitley Reports 
did not take up Whitleyism as it was preoccupied with its demand for nationalisation 
(Clay 1929:159). Nationalisation finally came with the postwar Labour government of 
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1945-51, when the major fuel, transport and power industries were brought under 
public ownership.  
 
 
2. Public Service Whitleyism under Voluntarism and ‘War Socialism’ 1919-1948 
: Methods, Structure, Ethos  
The public sector is heterogeneous but one can distinguish three sub-sectors 
historically. Central government or the civil service forms one with salaries and 
wages (manual or white-collar) paid out of taxation. Local government forms a 
second category where wages are funded through a combination of local taxes and 
central funding. Nationalised industries formed a third traditional category. 
 
This categorisation reflects the period of rationalisation and progressive 
modernisation of 1945-1979, through the establishment of national bargaining and the 
spread of Whitleyism. However, and despite common roots in Whitleyism, each 
public service, and with it trade union action, evolved historically according to the 
material constraints of local circumstances. Within each service, as local government 
demonstrates, the difference in union outlook and methods between white-collar and 
manual staff, in the pre-1914 period is stark. Municipal officers were wary of acting 
like private sector unions fearing this ‘retrogressive step’ which, while offering gains, 
would not offer security of tenure, higher pay scales and superannuation which were 
considered necessary to attract professionals. Trade unionism was ‘nausea’ and the 
strike weapon abhorrent (Spoor, 1967).9 They felt distinctive – a class apart, a new 
professional class of expert bureaucrats necessitated by and benefitting the growing 
public community services.10 They saw themselves as public servants who, with 
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teachers and other public service professionals, were distinctive because they had  
 
“…no dealings with private clients, none with the profit-making 
employer…its members are paid out of public funds…and all of them work 
under essentially public direction and control.”11 
 
However, in the interwar period they did use union methods to obtain standardised 
careers and superannuation. Whitleyism thus locked (as NALGO feared) public 
professionals into conciliation machinery which required union organisation and 
methods to achieve its ends. This sat uneasily with their desire to be part of a 
progressive state bureaucracy and their self-image as public servants and part of a 
‘local civil service’. However, in common with other public sector unions (but unlike 
private craft unions), they also used political lobbying as parliament had final 
authority over wages and conditions (Clegg et. al. 1964, p.215, 221).12  
 
The early municipal manual unions used political action too (lobbying central and 
local politicians) in their struggle against the sweated wages paid by private 
contractors. However, unlike their white-collar colleagues, they were deeply 
influenced by the political and industrial context of syndicalism and new unionism. 
And, the methods and tactics they developed were inextricably linked to those of the 
general unions (Hobsbawm, 1968; Clegg et. al. 1964). 
 
With the growth in local community services, local government employment stood at 
700,000 by 1911 and the wage bill was £200m or one-tenth of that for private sector 
employment with overall expenditure at £300m (Webb & Webb, 1920b, p.11). The 
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line between private and public was in many ways as opaque and incoherent as it has 
become again after decades of neoliberal reform. The consequent fragmentation of 
public services across each of the 2,000-plus local authorities was one reason why the 
local government manual Whitley NJIC demands for a national wage rate were 
difficult to achieve. On the other hand, growing local union militancy in some 
Northern regions and across public services, helps to explain why the government 
extended Whitleyism to government employment. Unions organising municipal 
workers “paid close attention to local elections” with the Gasworkers’ union and the 
Tramway unions using the extended franchise to support local councillors in order to 
improve working conditions and pay (Clegg et. al. 1964, p.88).  
 
In a letter to the Daily Courier regarding the 1913 municipal strike in Leeds, Arthur 
Greenwood (Labour MP and Secretary to the Whitley Committee) and Henry Clay 
(economist and academic) summed up some key points about public employment : a 
municipality ought to be a good employer and not deny its workers a conference on 
wages and conditions of labour; if the right to strike is to be denied to municipal 
employees, then “municipal wages should be on a special standard and comparison 
with other cities is of no use when there is no definite principle to tackle the 
problem”.13 The Yorkshire Post retaliated the next day: it railed against the university 
professors who were for the strike and against syndicalism which they railed “is not 
trade unionism …its main concern is the “holding up” of a community.”14 However, it 
agreed that  
 
“municipal employment ought to be slightly over, rather than under, the level 
of wages in similar occupations; it should attract the best men in the class 
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required.” 
 
These, and other, responses to the Leeds strike (erupting over Christmas 1913) reflect 
some of the key themes underlying public service IR and its evolution in the ensuing 
100 years. For, the lack of  ‘definite principle’ (complained of above) to tackle the 
problem of public sector wage determination and the status of public service labour in 
a capitalist economy has so far not received sustained study or treatment. Thus, the 
legal status of public employees is not clearly distinguishable from that of private 
employees and while legislation affecting particular groups of public employees 
exists, there has been no wholesale coverage of the civil service by statute as in, for 
example, France. As a consequence, in principle, there is no formal distinction 
between the state as an employer and a private citizen as an employer and thus, in 
practice, private labour law applies to public sector workers (Winchester, 1983)   
 
Thus, Whitleyism, while it offered hope to public sector workers, locked them into the 
voluntarism of the private sector. The consequent lack of sectoral 
coordination/planning meant that particular problems were resolved ad hoc. And 
though Whitleyism endorsed collective bargaining and nationally agreed rates of pay, 
this was difficult to achieve. For, under voluntarism and laissez-faire, at a time of 
falling prices after 1920 and mass unemployment, local employer resistance meant 
wages were established unilaterally.  
 
A similar pattern occurred during WWII with revived talk of reconstruction and 
planning with “organised Labour” urged to place the “whole of its power behind the 
war effort”.15 It was felt that, 
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“Men and women…fighting to destroy Nazism and Fascism intend to have 
something better than poverty, slums and unemployment…Reconstruction in 
the sense of tinkering up the old structure is not good enough. We must aim 
higher.”16 
 
There were increased levels of state intervention to maintain maximum production 
with the idea of a state medical service seen as increasingly inevitable and the 
Beveridge Report (1942) laying the foundations of the postwar welfare state.17 The 
government also intervened to staff shortages in public services, by “directing” 
workers into them and encouraging bargaining arrangements (Craik, 1955, p.89). As 
in WWI, government was keen to minimise industrial conflict. The Conditions of 
Employment and National Arbitration Order (1940) obliged employers to observe 
terms and conditions of employment not less favourable than “recognised terms and 
conditions” with any disputes referable to the National Arbitration Tribunal (Spoor, 
1967, p.193). In local government, NALGO used these provisions to secure national 
bargaining in 1943 with provincial Whitley council powers reduced and their 
recommendations subject to approval by the new national joint council (NJC).   
 
NJC minutes for manual non-trading services, through the war, show unions 
successfully using the Whitley provincial councils to obtain wage rises and war wage 
bonuses. Recourse to arbitration increased as did anomalies and divergences between 
councils. The employer side of the NJIC intervened by making war wage variations 
subject to national bargaining only. This meant unions were negotiating at both local 
and national levels. The NJIC Employers’ side complained that  
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“Trade unions’ continued practice of pressing for basic wage increases in the 
provincial councils and war wage increases in the NJIC is now assuming 
alarming implications.” 18 
 
By the end of the war, the Employers’ side accepted, in 1946, that national bargaining 
was a better option than endless disputes at local level over wages and bonuses.19  
 
Despite government encouragement of collective bargaining in health services (run by 
local councils) to tackle wartime labour shortages, authorities resisted national 
bargaining. The Beveridge Report’s (1942) recommendation for a National Health 
Service was not heeded until 1946. The new NHS Whitley NJIC was modelled on 
local government and the civil service.  
 
3. Public and Not Public : Laissez-faire and the limits and legacy of Residual 
State Intervention  
The economic doctrine of laissez-faire involves a separation of the political from the 
economic organisation of society. Clay saw the ‘early Liberals’ with their preference 
for laissez-faire as the “heirs of the Whigs” due to their distrust of “any concentration 
of authority” and their desire for “checks and balances to prevent the abuse of 
necessary authority” (1929). The latter included both fear of interference from 
politicians and civil servants. John Stuart Mill was very alive to this distrust of 
government interference, rooted in the 18th century fear of absolutism, when, in his 
Principles of Political Economy, he cautiously made a case for justified state 
intervention in certain circumstances (Mill, 1848). 
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Political and industrial agitation by the working classes led to some relaxation of the 
laissez-faire doctrine throughout the nineteenth century. The trend accelerated during 
WWI.  This ‘War socialism’, as Keynes noted, increased production to levels 
unknown in peace time convincing many of the benefits of state intervention while 
the doctrine of laissez-faire was seen increasingly as a ‘disreputable superstition’ 
(Keynes, 1926; Clay, 1929) Nevertheless, as Keynes intuited, the contest between the 
two orthodoxies, in practice, would centre less on technical, economic issues and 
more on the psychological and moral issues inherited from the Whig and Liberal 
legacies.  
 
This was reflected in the ambivalence of Mill, Keynes and Clay, major political 
economists of state intervention, who were not for socialism but for making 
capitalism work better. The result was a pattern of residual state intervention whereby 
state intervention grew in times of war but receded with the resurgence of economic 
downturns after war. Nevertheless, on a global social and cultural perspective, 
residual state intervention (in the form of Keyesianism), which after WWII was 
endorsed by a cross-party consensus, created a period of relative economic stability 
(Judt, 2008). 
 
However, a detailed examination of public sector IR, and the evolution of 
Whitleyism, reveals that the new welfare state was hit by economic crises and 
austerity immediately after 1945 with the new NHS staff soon becoming disillusioned 
as the government seemed keener to hold down wages than improve staff welfare 
(Carpenter, 1985, p.22). The reforms were substantial but the costs of nationalising 
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industries (considered obsolescent since World War I) in terms of compensation to 
private providers and modernisation were high (Clay, 1929, p.175; Hyman, 2001, 
p.97. “Socialization in a profoundly non-socialist country” (Seifert, 1992, p.12) in the 
context of economic crises thus deepened many of the contradictions that socialisation 
was intended to resolve.  
 
As Krugman notes, Keynesianism proposes state intervention to make capitalism 
work better but is “intellectually inherently unstable” partly because it is a  
 
“regime that by and large lets markets work, but in which the government is 
ready both to rein in excesses and fight slumps.” (Krugman, 2011, p.23)  
 
In other words, Keynesianism continued the policy of residual state intervention 
which, from the 19th century, was concerned to offset the worst social consequences 
of free market economics by creating public services (Gill-McLure, 2013). But, this 
cyclical and ad hoc approach suffers from a lack of analysis around questions 
concerning: the legal or economic status of the public service labour created during 
periods of intervention; or the principles for determining pay in a non-market sector. 
John Stewart Mill, R.H. Tawney, G.D.H.Cole, G.B. Shaw, Laski and the Webbs 
(liberal and socialist thinkers) to take some leading examples, considered some of the 
problems involved in managing public employees. Civil servants and local 
government officers also debated issues around public service and public 
administration in their association journals, but their work was not taken up and 
developed in any systematic form.20 There was nothing akin to the systematic debate, 
or institutional definition of public service found in early 20th century French 
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administrative jurisprudence around the notion of ‘le service public’. This notion, by 
providing “powerful conceptual machinery” for redefining the modern state’s tasks as 
the satisfaction of collective needs and social integration, acted as “a major driver of 
social and political change” Chevallier, 1987, p.9). And, despite attacks by neoliberal 
policies, it remains a powerful concept (see Rouban, this issue). 
 
Instead, the legacy of public service fragmentation, rooted in and redolent (even in 
1947) of Victorian times, was reflected in the multiplicity of unions and the make-up 
of staff and employer sides of Whitley councils (Spoor, 1967, p.348-351; Carpenter, 
1985). In local government, the Employers’ side represented over 2,000 local 
authorities of varying size ranging from county councils to rural districts, each with 
different needs and different political tendencies. The negotiating machinery in the 
NHS Whitley councils was ‘complex and divided, the issues confused by political 
pressures’. The fact that the government was paymaster but not present on the 
Committees, meant delays as management sides had to gain approval for pay claims.  
 
In local government, the employer side is made up of local politicians which further 
complicates negotiations and indeed influences union tactics. These considerations 
necessitate an analysis of the distinctiveness of public service IR. However,  
 
“In the voluminous literature on British trade unions there is virtually no 
treatment of public service unions as a distinct set of institutions. “ (Terry, 
2001, p. 2) 
 
An historical and political economy perspective is crucial for understanding the 
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issues: in particular, the similarities and differences between public and private sector 
unions. Thus, from their beginnings in the late 19th century, partly because of 
government reluctance to recognise unions amongst their own staff, manual unions 
used the methods of private sector unions such as the strike. But, they also used 
political pressure on local and central politicians and the press to make their 
arguments and win public support. In sum, they engaged in a political process and 
used private sector union methods.  
 
A key strength of Whitleyism lay in its flexibility and hence ability to accommodate 
these two methods.  In local government, by 1947, manual and professional staff 
forged distinctive machinery to settle pay and conditions but in ways which also 
embodied a ‘professional public service ethos’. This ethos is often mentioned but 
rarely analysed and yet it is a key traditional part of public servants’ identity which 
shapes their political and workplace behaviour. From a labour process perspective: 
public service workers produce use values rather than commodities; the services 
(other than utilities and transport) are free and paid for out of taxation. In the absence 
of a market and the (traditionally) limited pressure to produce surplus value, there is 
not a formal economic opposition/tension between production costs and consumer 
prices. Indeed there are technically no consumers but public citizens who ‘need’ 
services. These public needs are determined through the ballot box and not through 
supply and demand mechanisms. In consequence, the public labour process is 
characterised by the kind of relative autonomy that enables public servants to act as 
mediators between the state and the citizen (Peters & Pierre, 2014). It explains the 
‘psychological bond’ that public sector workers so often describe as having with their 
patients, students, pupils and other members of the public that they serve.  
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However, this flexibility of Whitley was also a weakness as the voluntarist principle 
underlying it perpetuated contradictory and conflictual behaviour amongst public 
service managers, employers, governments and unions. Thus, historically, a public 
service ethos evolved within a system lacking institutional support from a 
formal/political recognition of the need for non-market pay determination principles 
and mechanisms capable of untangling these contradictions. The resulting legacy of 
fragmentation, voluntarism and laissez-faire meant the union and employer sides were 
complex with a multiplicity of unions and employers with differing interests. 
Government, as paymaster, delayed settlements and the lack of distinctive principles 
for pay determination created serious problems in the context of postwar austerity and 
crisis.  
 
However, these problems were not intrinsic to the Whitley structure or philosophy of 
multi-tier, permanent arrangements for joint regulation of pay and working 
conditions. Rather, this progressive approach of joint regulation in public service IR 
created an institutional basis for a universal public service after 1945. It helped to 
drag Victorian approaches to public welfare into the twentieth century: national salary 
and wage structures rationalised service delivery; the relatively better pensions and 
working conditions helped attract qualified personnel by creating a career structure 
and, despite lower wages, staff were attracted by the public service ethos. 
 
Whitley’s later decline is arguably more logically traceable to the residual nature of 
state intervention in the UK whereby the function of the public sector under 
Keynesianism is to aid capital accumulation by correcting market imperfections. This 
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default approach in the context of economic crises and declining international 
competitiveness left the newly created progressive public service IR infrastructure of 
national pay bargaining under massive strain.  
 
 
4. The Rise and Fall of the 'Traditional Whitley System' : comparability, low pay 
and  rising discontent 1948-1979   
The social or public dimension of wage bargaining became more apparent with the 
growth of the nationalised industries and the public sector generally which at 1950 
employed more than a fifth of the labour force (Wootton, 1962, p.105). In local 
government and the NHS, where services are free at the point of delivery, the major 
cost over which there is any government or managerial influence is labour costs. 
Attempts to contain public expenditure amounts here to a declaration to keep labour 
costs down (Wootton, 1962; Allen, 1966, p.62).   
 
In 1955, the Priestley Commission attempted to tackle the problem of pay 
determination in a non-market sector through the principle of 'fair comparison' (with 
private sector pay) for the civil service. Comparability (used as a reference point 
throughout the public sector), consultative arrangements and arbitration procedures 
together formed the institutional expression of a tacit agreement between the state to 
act as a good employer and state employees and their unions to refrain from industrial 
action (Winchester, 1983). However, comparability simply locked public sector pay 
into the “absurdities and contradictions” of the classical theories of wage 
determination in a free market; for the notion of fairness in 'fair comparisons' is as 
“notoriously devoid of a rational guiding principle” in public sector pay as in the 
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private sector (Wootton, 1962, p.11,162). Thus, the Priestley formula (and 
Whitleyism), which traded better conditions in the public sector for lower pay, began 
to be challenged, by for example NALGO, in the context of incomes policies 
(Newman, 1982; Farnham, 1979).  The exercise took time leading to high pay claims 
to ‘catch up’ in order to make up for time elapsed between pay claim and settlement 
dates. This ‘cycle of relative pay decline, increasing conflict and large pay awards’, 
was exacerbated by wage freezes and led to the first ever national civil servants' strike 
in 1973 (Lawrence, 1973;White, 1994).  
 
More generally, in the context of 1960s wage restraint, a number of features of public 
sector IR left staff with a rising sense of resentment. For example, opportunities for 
wage drift were few, with limited room for the 'productivity bargaining' found in the 
private sector, finance was controlled by central government and as paymaster, 
government could more ‘strictly apply’ incomes policies (Levinson, 1971, p.71-77; 
Lawrence, 1973). Further, much public sector work was/is difficult to measure with 
little or no experience/expertise in work measurement techniques. 
 
In addition, despite Harold Wilson’s insistence (in 1974) that civil servants would be 
treated fairly and that the government would not retreat from comparability, pay 
research informing comparability was suspended between 1975-1979 (Painter, 1982, 
p.23). However, to see frustrations with comparability or the uneven impact of 
incomes policies as the sole and direct causes of public sector militancy is over-
simplistic. One needs additionally to look at the shifting nature of public sector 
employment, union policies and politics. Civil servant attitudes were becoming less 
deferential towards authority. In 1981, staff became involved in one of the longest 
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disputes since 1926 (ibid.p.19). They were reacting not just to problems with 
comparability but to the government’s retreat from a participatory approach to pay 
determination and its ‘poujadist’ and hostile attitude to  its officials’ proclaimed 
‘waste’ and bureaucracy (Hennesy in Painter, 1982).  
 
In local government, the postwar shifting social composition of NALGO members 
saw increasing numbers of clerks from a working-class background with a stronger 
trade union tradition (Newman, 1982). This provided NALGO with the basis of a 
more radicalised membership. Growing numbers of redundant manufacturing workers 
absorbed by the public sector during the deindustrialising 1970s saw shifting views on 
industrial action and trade union organisation. Strains on comparability at a time of 
high inflation and increased international competition meant increasing pressure on 
public sector union leaderships to develop more democratic organisational structures 
to contain radical demands of the New Left in teaching and local government (Seifert, 
1987).  
 
A report into NHS Whitleyism found one problem was government involvement in 
central negotiations (McCarthy, 1976). Major problems occurred due to a 
management side made up of  “employers who do not pay and paymasters who do not 
employ” (para.2.3). The complexity and centralisation of Whitley bargaining left local 
government and NHS staff feeling distanced from decisions by managers and unions.  
 
Unions’ increasing reluctance to use arbitration was seen as another cause of 
increased industrial conflict (Levinson, 1971, p.31). By 1979, public service unions 
affiliated to the TUC had an estimated membership of  4.5m and constituted 37.4 per 
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cent of all trade unionism (IDS, 1989). They responded to the public expenditure cuts 
of 1975-1978 with the wave of public sector strikes dubbed the ‘winter of discontent’.  
 
The Clegg Commission on Pay Comparability was set up in the wake of the strikes by 
the Labour government. Despite its narrow definition of comparability (Clegg, 1980, 
para.70), the Commission took a broadly Keynesian/pluralist approach to public 
sector pay militancy seeing it as due to imperfections in the economic system which it 
was the function of government to put right. The Conservatives disagreed and 
abolished the Commission deciding not to take up its recommendation for a more 
holistic approach to public sector pay. Instead, it preferred to move away from the 
postwar Whitley formula for industrial peace through joint regulation.   
 
4. Neo-Victorian Modernisation of Whitleyism? Neo-liberalism, New Public 
Management (NPM) and Austerity 1979-Present 
The Conservative government’s commitment to reducing public expenditure in 
absolute terms marked a radical break with the postwar Keynesian consensus (Joseph, 
1976; Lawson, 1992). And, the  famous ‘parasite thesis’ -  public sector expenditure is 
parasitic on and saps the wealth-creating potential of the private sector – was one 
argument behind the Thatcher government’s determination to reduce the size of the 
public sector and the influence of its unions (Bacon and Eltis, 1978; Beaumont and 
Leopold, 1985) . A radical break with progressive public administration was signalled 
by the rebirth of monetarism to justify public spending cuts and public choice theory 
to justify NPM (Dunleavy, 1991).  
 
A mix of ideological and financial factors have been behind the drive to reform and 
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reduce the size of the public sector since 1979. The programme of reforms included 
privatisation of public utilities and corporations, marketisation through various means 
including compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) and a move away from  
comparability to ‘affordability’ as the guiding principle of public sector pay 
determination.  
 
However, public sector employment continued to grow until the early 1980s when it 
employed 30% of the workforce (Cribb, Disney and Sibieta, 2014). By the early 
1990s, it still accounted for over a fifth of the workforce remaining around 20% by 
2012. The reduction was due to privatisation of the nationalised industries with jobs 
losses in local government and NHS due to CCT adding to the decline. Public 
services are labour intensive with the pay bill accounting for the bulk of public 
spending. Controlling the overall pay bill, restructuring pay levels and pay 
determination methods was therefore a key priority. Austerity since 2010 can indeed 
be seen as another key mechanism for achieving this with over 700,000 jobs lost in 
local government alone and wages frozen for long periods with a 1% pay cap on pay 
across the public service.  
 
From 1979, high levels of public pay expenditure in labour intensive public services 
was to be reduced by making the public sector more like the private through linking 
pay to markets and performance.  In line with the changed pay policy and ideology, 
the institutional structure and culture of pay determination slowly evolved from the 
largely centralised Whitley structures of the postwar period. It is important to note the 
different sources of change in the sector: formal changes to pay negotiation structures 
and attempts to link pay rises to changes in conditions of service (pensions have come 
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under particular attention).  In addition, reorganisation and marketisation of services 
have transformed (and fragmented) the public service IR landscape.  
 
Pay Review Bodies (PRBs) by 1991 covered 1.5m employees including teachers, 
certain NHS staff and top civil servants. For some, these represent a radical shift away 
from the Whitley model which involves annual free collective bargaining between 
employers and staff, albeit with government interference/involvement. Others see 
continuity: for, while they formally removed over a million employees from national 
pay bargaining, they continue to encourage cooperation and dissemination of 
evidence by unions (Bach and Winchester, 1999, p.44). Strictly speaking though, 
PRBs do not involve direct bargaining; instead, unions and employers make 
representations to a panel appointed by the Prime Minister. Their claim to be rational, 
less remote and with less government intervention than Whitley, is contestable 
(Seifert, 1992, p. 277). And in light of the fact that government sets policy, financial 
targets and performance targets, the “nominal independence of the new self-governing 
trusts” could be said to be “heavily circumscribed” (Bach and Winchester, 1999, p. 
31) 
 
Direct negotiations on Whitley lines remained in local government, universities, the 
lower ranks of the civil service and lower paid groups in the NHS. PRB pay 
settlements have been generally higher than direct settlements. This, and the 
fragmentation of public services through outsourcing, has created anomalies, and 
erosion of internal and external (across public services) pay differentials since the 
1980s. Where direct negotiation remains, there have been increasing moves towards a 
national pay framework with increasing local flexibility. Local flexibility made little 
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progress in the 1980s. However since 2010, local authorities, under pressure to meet 
statutory standards of service under reduced budgets, have begun reducing terms and 
conditions locally. In schools, where schoolteachers are covered by PRB but staff 
support are covered by direct negotiations with local authorities, this has led to staff 
resentment over unfair treatment as different staff within the same service (indeed in 
the same school) find themselves with different levels of pay and conditions. The 
current industrial conflict amongst school teaching assistants is a direct outcome of 
such anomalies and austerity as some find their pay being cut by 25% to cover term-
time working only (Harris, 2016) 
 
Local government – a key site of 1970s industrial conflict - was a central target for 
reform. Reform of the sector’s financial and institutional framework included rate-
capping which restricted local authorities’ ability to raise local finance to tackle local 
problems. Reforms were aimed at controlling and curbing not only union power but 
local management (made up of local politicians) power to deflect central policy 
imperatives. However, the dispersion of power on the employer side meant that 
effective control eluded central government during the 1980s (Winchester, 1983).  
 
Such shifts, inspired by NPM, aim to make the public sector more like the private. 
This regressive managerialist approach to public administration claims to be more 
efficient and accountable than the traditional professional bureaucratic progressive 
approach. In line with this preference CCT, from 1988, required local authorities and 
hospitals to submit their manual work for competitive tender with private sector bids. 
Moving from ‘direct’ labour to ‘contracted’ labour was done through a new service 
delivery model embodying key NPM principles: devolved budgets to new cost centres 
N  30 
and the purchaser/provider split created a new locus for service delivery. And, it 
bypassed traditional departmental structures headed by professional officers. The new 
model was aimed at reducing costs through removal of hierarchies to make cost-
centres more budget-led rather than service-led. It was designed to reduce 
politicisation of IR by reducing elected member, professional and central union 
involvement in the specification and management of manual service specification. 
NPM thus redefines ‘efficiency’ and ‘accountability’ in public service delivery: 
efficiency is wholly financial and about cost-cutting while accountability is linked to 
consumer satisfaction and meeting central targets rather than meeting democratically 
defined needs.   
  
Trade unions resisted cuts and market reforms throughout the 1980s with periodic 
full-scale national confrontations as with the NHS in 1982. In local government, 
influenced by TUC public service strategy, union policies converged in a campaign 
against the Green Paper’s (1985) consultation on competition. They developed the 
Joint Working approach to CCT involving coalitions between professional and 
manual unions working with sympathetic managers, technicians, accountants and 
councillors to successfully keep services in-house (Wainwright and Little, 2009; Gill-
McLure, 2014). It included influencing tender specifications and building stronger 
workplace organisation. Shop stewards met staff to examine how/if costs could be cut 
without loss of service quality (Gill-McLure, Ironside and Seifert, 2003). 
 
Civil service reforms included a shift to separate agencies tasked with executive 
activities and responsibility for negotiating pay and conditions (Fairbrother,1994). 
Civil service-wide pay was abolished in 1996 except for senior civil servants whose 
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pay is negotiated by an independent pay review body; though, the Treasury continues 
to exert a strong influence on the 150 new bargaining units (Bach, 2010, p.166). 
Reform of the Whitley pay structures and ethos in the civil service has been more 
comprehensive than elsewhere in the public sector with government in a position to 
exercise more direct control (Bach and Winchester, 2003, p. 300). The government, in 
its 2013 Spending Review announced an end to automatic time-served progression 
through annual increments by 2016 (HM Treasury,2015). It is being replaced by 
performance-based assessment. A recent survey of full-time scientific, professional 
and technical grades however found a preference for traditional methods of pay 
determination with a clear link between pay and performance and clarity around pay 
criteria (Kessler, Heron, Paul and Gagnon, 2006). The findings reflect low morale and 
discontent amongst civil servants who went on strike in 2014 against pay freezes and 
a cut of 20% in real incomes since 2010.  
 
In the NHS, reforms included the creation of trusts with power to set pay locally from 
1991. However, progress with local pay systems was slow with only a minority of 
trust taking this option (IRS, 1997, p. 2-11). Slow uptake has been due to a number of 
reasons: including managers’ preference for less time-consuming methods - it 
reportedly took six years in one trust (Corby et.al. 2003, p513). New Labour’s Agenda 
for Change (1999) attempted again to modernise pay systems in the NHS.  It aimed to 
streamline pay structures with three pay spines – one for doctors, one for nurses and 
another for all other staff and to enable cross-functional working and compliance with 
equal pay legislation. Core conditions of work are set nationally with others done 
locally (Bach and Winchester, 2003, p. 303). There were delays in implementation but 
broad support for the proposals from unions and management.  
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Agenda for Change is under pressure now from austerity policies but in the aftermath 
of the 2015 strike, the unions are proposing ways in which to make the pay structures 
less complex and fairer (UNISON, 2016) In their evidence to the PRB in 2016/17, the 
staff side calls for a universal uplift to wages rather than a targeted approach. They 
point out that trusts are on the whole supportive of the Agenda but that it is under 
pressure due to outsourcing. They note the  
 
“many and interconnected challenges facing the NHS workforce, including 
increasing use of agency staff, stagnating wage levels, declining morale and 
motivation and increased staff shortages.” (NHS Pay Review Body 2016-17, 
p2) 
 
Labour shortages have been reported from the late 1980s across the public services 
including the civil service, NHS staff and schoolteachers. Schools were given the 
power to opt out of local authority control (Education Reform Act 1988) giving 
central government more legal powers. Under this Local Management of Schools 
initiative, contracts of employment in opted-out schools were transferred to school 
governing bodies with schools having devolved budgets and people management 
duties (Ironside and Seifert, 1995).The move followed union disputes and conflicts 
between Labour authorities and central government. The Burnham variation of 
Whitley for school teachers (established in 1919) was abolished in 1986 and replaced 
by the School Teachers Review Body in 1991.  
 
In its first report the STRB felt staff shortages were not a big problem and proposed 
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pay enhancements for teachers demonstrating performance improvements (STRB, 
2009). However, shortages in teaching have been highlighted by the unions citing low 
pay, high workloads and large class sizes as causes. Pay structures have been 
reformed and by 2009, the STRB was expressing concern about the multiplicity of 
local arrangements for pay and conditions developing without an overall framework 
for guidance (STRB, 1992). However, they also felt any statement of teacher 
responsibilities should be ‘concise, enabling and flexible’. In the event, teacher and 
heads of school workloads (up to 60 hours a week in some cases) have continued to 
increase with recent research reporting that only Japan and Alberta, Canada had 
higher teacher workloads (Labour Research, Nov. 2016. p.4) .  
 
Local government is the largest sector still to be covered by national, direct 
bargaining along Whitley lines for over 2.64m people or 1/8 of the workforce (ONS, 
2012). Despite pressure from central government from the 1980s, the employers' side 
retained national bargaining preferring local flexibility with in an increasingly 
'framework' agreement.  However, a minority of small district authorities in the 
South-East of England pulled out of national bargaining, with some later coming back 
in (LGMB, 1996). In 1993, the three major municipal unions, NUPE, COHSE 
(Confederation of Health Service Employees) and NALGO merged to form UNISON 
with 1.5m members now the largest public service union. The National Joint Council 
(NJC) for manuals and the NJC for white-collar staff merged to form a single NJC. A 
new single-table national agreement introduced a common pay spine based on three 
principles: flexibility, simplicity and equality. This Single Status Agreement functions 
like that in the NHS having core conditions set nationally but with others that are 
variable locally.  
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New Labour, in 1997, replaced CCT with Best Value (BV) imposing a general duty to 
‘secure continuous improvement’. An authority’s performance would be measured 
according to centrally determined ‘performance indicators’ and ‘performance 
standards’. Authorities were to undertake reviews of functions and produce annual 
performance plans to be audited. BV retained the emphasis on competition but 
claimed to be less prescriptive than CCT. However, studies found 25-30% of pilot 
authorities recommended competitive tendering with or without an in-house bid, with 
a continuation of work intensification, job loss and job insecurity (Richardson et.al., 
2005). New Labour increased funding in some areas but their ‘modernisation’ of 
finance and quality issues, as well as the continuation of restructuring initiated by the 
Conservatives, has increased bureaucracy, complexity and workload thereby 
entrenching further the ‘audit society’. 
 
Thus, NPM continued to inform New Labour’s public service policy with workforce 
issues centre-stage for achieving centrally-imposed performance targets. The push for 
decentralised pay bargaining was further intensified to make it more market-led. 
There has been further erosion of the Priestley formula for offsetting lower wages 
with better conditions (such as pensions and holidays), by shifting to a Total Rewards 
Strategy that attempts to balance low pay with lower conditions by building pensions 
and holiday entitlements into wage-setting principles (LGE, 2007).  
 
NPM, marketisation, pressure on terms and conditions were key policies for the 
coalition government 2010-15. Six years of austerity under the Coalition government 
and the Conservatives has meant more and even bigger cuts to public expenditure 
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with much of this achieved through job loss and pay freezes. At 20% of total 
employment in 2012, public sector employment is at its lowest in 40 years. Although 
education and health are protected, the Office for Budget Responsibility forecasts that 
1.1m jobs will go by 2018-19 bringing public sector employment down to 14.8% of 
total employment (Cribb et. al., 2014). The pressure of austerity on jobs, conditions 
and living standards has led to demoralisation of public servants with working days 
lost due to strikes peaking in 2011 (ONS, 2014). 
 
Concluding Discussion: The Past and Future of Public Service Whitleyism – 
‘Wars of Ideas’ 
Post-1979 ‘modernisation’ has attempted to transform the Whitley model of pay 
determination. Recent trends illustrate the slow but inexorable shift from the Whitley 
pluralist ethos/philosophy as it evolved in the 1919-1979 era : collectively negotiated 
pay and conditions in multi-tiered machinery at national, regional and workplace 
levels; public service as ‘good employer’ offering job security; pay determination 
through fair comparisons with the private sector; lower pay to be offset by better 
working conditions and relative worker autonomy. The voluntarist approach of 
leaving the parties largely to settle the shape, texture and content of bargaining under 
Whitley has been replaced by a top-down, command-and-control, interventionist 
framework of centrally-imposed targets driven by a philosophy of cost-cutting, 
marketisation and performance management.  
 
Performance measurement techniques based on centrally-established targets claim to 
provide a universal standard of service delivery and accountability. In reality, the 
continued adherence to a public service ethos by a low paid and diminishing 
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workforce makes up the ever-increasing gap between diminished funding and 
democratically-established public service levels and standards. The result has been 
systemic and systematic demoralisation of staff suffering from work intensification as 
cost reduction and central targets become major drivers of labour management and 
service delivery. A commonly expressed concern amongst staff is that increased 
workloads with staff covering for absent colleagues means people working beyond 
their comfort zones and competences. The consequent job blurring increases stress, 
accident and injury. Centrally-driven performance management creates ‘a blame and 
bullying culture’ with blame being driven down from central government through 
tiers of management down to frontline staff and service users. The dangers and 
problems of setting targets without consulting ‘the real experts’ (the staff) in terms of 
patient safety were criticised and publicised by the Francis inquiry into the mid-
Staffordshire NHS Trust (Francis Report, 2010). 
 
The government policy of outsourcing the problem to the private sector has been 
reported to be unworkable in the prison and probation service. Marketisation policy 
overlooks the fact that public service delivery is determined by social need rather than 
market demand; decisions about that delivery require worker judgement and 
discretion. Public service work has traditionally been characterised by relative 
autonomy among its workforce, who valued this sufficiently to balance low pay with 
a sense of working for the community. That this delicate balance between high 
autonomy and low pay worked well in delivering effective services by keeping public 
expenditure under control was recognised by the Priestley Commission.  
 
The locus of pay bargaining in local government remains an important question: will 
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the last bastion of National Whitleyism in local government succumb to 40 years of 
central government pressure? The employers remain ambivalent: the need for a 
national pay framework though not ‘pre-ordained’, is ‘useful’ for a number of 
reasons: to drive change in an agreed direction, advocate the employer interest, build 
in national economic requirements in pay increases and provide minimum standards 
(LGA, 2007).  
 
This ambivalence highlights the continued importance of other obstacles to 
decentralised bargaining in the public sector which include: lack of management 
skills; the political sensitivity of public service provision and high trade union density 
(Corby et.al., 2003). High public sector union density (generally in Europe, Canada 
and the US) means continued potential to resist marketisation and the break-up of 
national bargaining.  
 
The historian Tony Judt recently noted the 21st century tendency to neglect the history 
of the 20th century (Judt, 2008). The power of the ideas that dominated a century of 
two world wars however has not diminished despite this reluctance to look back. The 
Wartime Reconstruction Committees of both wars were painfully aware of the ‘War 
of Ideas’ which had to be won if economic recession, revolution and fascism were to 
be avoided in the future.21 This concern lay behind the construction of the welfare 
state in recognition of the need to protect society from the instability of free markets. 
The lesson to be learnt from the weaknesses of these Keynesian-type policies is not to 
deregulate markets but to learn how to regulate them more efficiently.  
 
Public sector IR is complex. This complexity derives from its historical roots and its 
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evolution that deeply influenced the methods, structure and ethos of its unions, 
management and pay determination practice and principles. The ad hoc growth of 
public services meant a lack of any clear demarcation between public and private 
spheres in the late 19th century. In their struggle for public service and decent pay, 
early manual government employees were influenced by the new unionism of private 
sector unions organising semi-skilled and unskilled workers. White-collar government 
workers were reluctant to take the union route preferring to evolve a distinctive public 
service approach to pay and conditions but, in time, they followed manuals into union 
organisation.  
 
Whitleyism gave much-needed institutional support and a critical fillip to these 
organising efforts. It pushed governments into recognising unions and into 
establishing conciliation machinery. However, it locked public services into the 
voluntarist pattern/ethos of private sector IR. In the absence of a determined effort to 
institute a distinctive ethos/approach for managing public service pay and conditions, 
the sector inherited problems rooted in lack of clarity around the role of the state in 
public sector IR; problems of pay determination in a non-market sector; problems of 
union organisation; problems around right to strike and to join unions, to name a few.  
 
These problems were mooted across the decades, but not in any concerted manner. 
So, the  Committee reporting to the War Cabinet on a draft Whitley constitution for 
the civil service noted some ‘vital’ differences between public and private 
employment :  the state is the ‘ultimate employer’, heads of department, unlike private 
employers, cannot decide on wages and conditions; the profit and loss check (of 
private employment) is replaced by Treasury control. 22 The Tomlin Report (1931) 
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agreed saying that these considerations demanded a statement of principles for 
determining remuneration and conditions of civil servants. The Commission felt the 
notion of ‘good employer’ (invoked already for a number of decades) was of no 
‘practical guidance’ but that broad general comparisons with outside occupations 
were possible and should be made. Comparability however, when finally introduced 
in 1955, posed problems. It was replaced by affordability from the 1980s.  
 
These problems highlight the underlying politics of public service pay determination 
which demands a reasoned and historically-informed debate around the role of public 
services in a capitalist economy; the benefits of a mixed economy (social protections 
as guarantor of economic growth) and the problems of pay determination in a non-
market sector. An unintended consequence of Whitleyism is that this debate has been 
sidelined. This debate requires a thorough examination of the weaknesses and 
strengths of public service Whitleyism – some of which have been sketched here. 
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Notes 
                         
1 This model was composed roughly of the original differential strategies of manual 
and white-collar unions.  
2 Foote, sees these as comprising Labour Marxists, for example, Thomas Mann and 
Hyndman; Fabians and Guild Socialists 
3 Button was ex-Executive member of the Amalgamated Society of Engineers. 
4 This argument applied to the local government Whitley Committees set up in 1919. 
5 Greenwood, handwritten notes/letter on the Leeds municipal strike of 1913, 
MS.Eng.C.6175, fol.30: Bodleain Library. 
6 The Whitley Report, para. 15, enumerates the suggested functions to be covered by 
the committees and para. 15(1v) points out “the need for regular methods of 
negotiation….with a view to prevention of differences.” 
7 Bodleain Library, MS.Eng.c.6216.fol.37. War Cabinet. Committee of  
Reconstruction Problems, 1941.  
8 MRC, MSS.372/MNL/1/1 NJIC minutes for non-trading services, 1919. 
9 MRC,MSS.20/NAL/4/1/11: Municipal Officer, Feb 1919 
10 MRC, MSS.20/NAL/4/1/11: Municipal Officer, Jan. 1916, 3-5 
11 MRC, MSS.20/NAL/4/1/11: quotation from Beatrice Webb in Municipal Officer , 
Jan. 1916. 
12 MSS.20/NAL/4/1/11: Municipal Officer Nov. 1919 notes the request to the Minister 
of Health to bring up in parliament the issue of the refusal of a war bonus scale by 
Colne corporation.  
13 Bodleian, MS. Eng. c. 6175, Daily Courier, 26.12.13.  
14 Bodleian, MS. Eng. c. 6175, Yorkshire Post, 27.12. 13 
N  41 
                                                                      
15  Bodleian, MS. Eng. c. 6216, Greenwood memorandum on ‘The Labour Party and 
the Future’, (undated).  
16 Bodleian, MS. Eng. c. 6243, fol. 45,Memo to Reconstruction Committee,  The War 
of Ideas, Feb 1941. 
17 Bodleian, MS. Eng. c. 6243, Somerville Hastings, ‘From Panel to Public Service’, 
1940, Lancet, Feb. 24, p375; Beveridge Report. 
18 MRC, MSS.372/MNL/1/6, NJIC, Non-trading services, Nov. 1945, para. 4 
19 Ibid. Jan. 1946 
20 MRC, MSS.20/NAL/4/1/11: Municipal Officer, Jan. 1916, 3-5; See Gill-McLure, 
‘The Political Economy’ for a treatment of Mills, Cole, Tawney on the distinctiveness 
of public service administration. 
21 Bodleian, MS. Eng. c.6186, fol.32-3: Letter from Ministry of Labour to Employers 
and Unions, 20th October, 1917 ;Bodleian, MS. Eng. c. 6243, fol. 45,Memo to 
Reconstruction Committee,  The War of Ideas, Feb 1941. 
22 Bodleian, MS. Eng. c. 6186, fols, 35-37:Sub-committee of the inter-departmental 
committee on the application of the Whitley Report to Government establishments, 
Report on The application of the Whitley Report to the Administrative Departments 
of the Civil Service’, 1919, Special Collections,. Bodleian Library, Oxford University 
Library Services). 
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